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In 2015 an estimated 1,011,712 people crossed the 
Mediterranean to Europe in search of safety and a better 
life. 3,770 are known to have died trying to make this 
journey1. Funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) and the Department for International 
Development (DfID), the MEDMIG project examines 
the dynamics, determinants, drivers and infrastructures 
underpinning this recent migration across and loss of life 
in the Mediterranean. This research brief presents some of 
our findings in relation to the Central Mediterranean route 
from North Africa to Italy and Malta, exploring the dynamics 
of migration before, during and after the sea crossing. We 
will place particular focus on the motivations, routes and 
experiences of those making the journey and local, national 
and European Union (EU) policy responses.
During 2014 and 2015 over 320,000 people made the sea 
crossing from North Africa towards Europe, arriving in Italy 
and, to a far lesser degree, Malta. And although the vast 
majority of the arrivals to Europe by sea during 2015 were 
through the Eastern Mediterranean to Greece, by far the 
greatest number of deaths was recorded in the Central 
Mediterranean. Whereas on the Eastern Mediterranean 
route one death was recorded for every 1049 arrivals in 
2015, on the Central route there was one death for every 
53 arrivals2.  According to IOM, 2,731 people were dead or 
missing at 31st August 2016, a higher figure than the same 
period over the past two years3.  The death rate across the 
route is now, at the time of writing, 2.4%, up from 2.2% the 
same period a year ago. Between January and August of 
2016 one person has died on the journey for every 42 who 
have arrived (see Figure 1). 
Introduction
1
1   See IOM (2016) Mixed Migration: Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information 2015. Geneva: IOM (GMDAC) 
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/Mixed-Flows-Mediterranean-and-Beyond-Compilation-Overview-2015.pdf
2  Crawley, H. and Sigona, N.(2016) ‘European policy is driving refugees to more dangerous routes across the Med’, The Conversation http://theconversation.
com/european-policy-is-driving-refugees-to-more-dangerous-routes-across-the-med-56625
3  Deaths data is online at http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean 
Figure 1. Arrivals, deaths and death rate across the Central Mediterranean route, Jan-August 2014-2016
Despite efforts by governments and international organisations 
to save lives and control migration across the Central 
Mediterranean, people have continued to attempt the 
crossing. This highlights an urgent need to better understand 
migration flows along this route to Europe. 
Responses from policymakers have tended to adopt a 
particular understanding of the drivers and nature of migration 
from North Africa to Southern Europe which is based on 
two main assumptions. The first claims that those making 
the journey across this route are mostly so-called ‘economic 
migrants’ seeking employment and better lifestyles because 
they originate from countries that are not engaged in 
warfare4.  Their nationality is employed as a short-cut that 
undermines their claims for international protection. The 
second assumption states that migration across the Central 
Mediterranean is the result of strong pull factors in Europe 
encouraging refugees and migrants5 to make their dangerous 
journeys. According to this logic, the best response is to adopt 
a tough stance that can deter people from making the journey. 
As will be shown throughout this Research Brief, our 
research highlights significant shortcomings in these 
assumptions in the context of mixed and composite 
migration flows in the Central Mediterranean.
The Brief is structured over three sections, examining the 
recent history of migration across the Central Mediterranean, 
followed by a look at the MEDMIG data on migrant and refugee 
journeys, and the evolving context of arrival and reception in 
Europe. It draws on 202 interviews with refugees and migrants 
who crossed the Central Mediterranean Sea to Italy or Malta 
in 2015 and 55 in-depth interviews with key actors in Italy and 
Malta, as well as field observations and a desk-based review 
of the existing literature. The profile of the people that we 
interviewed broadly reflects the composition of flows at point 
of arrival in Italy and Malta, with a wide range of nationalities 
represented from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn 
of Africa and elsewhere in the world (see Figure 2). Our sample 
also included a majority of male respondents (87%) over female 
ones (13%), which is a similar pattern to that found in the 
arriving population of refugees and migrants in 2015.
2
4   See for example, Reuters (2015) Migranti, Alfano: rimpatriare quelli economici, Ue partecipi economicamente a ‘hotspot’, Reuters Italia, http://it.reuters. 
    com/article/topNews/idITKBN0OX1NI20150617
5   We use the term ‘refugees and migrants’ throughout this Research Brief to reflect the nature of ‘mixed flows’ across the Mediterranean.
Figure 2: Number of respondents who crossed the Central Mediterranean route to 
Italy or Malta (n = 202). See Appendix for full figures.
Throughout history, patterns of trade and population 
movement have defined the Mediterranean as a space of 
mobility and exchange. Italy in particular has played an 
important and evolving role in the region during modern 
times, from exporter of colonial settlers to receiver of 
workers and, increasingly, those seeking refuge. Today it 
plays a key role in migration dynamics, receiving almost 
all of those intercepted crossing the sea by boat.
Over recent years the scale of migration flows by boat 
across the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa 
has increased dramatically (Figure 3). This has led to 
frequent claims of an ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ in the region, 
from the so-called North Africa Emergency (Emergenza 
Nord Africa) of 2011 to the more recent ‘Mediterranean 
migration crisis’. Between 1997 and 2010 an average 
of 23,000 migrants travelled to Italy by boat per year; in 
2011 this rose to 63,000 and in 2014 it reached 170,000, 
before decreasing slightly to little over 153,800 in 2015. 
In Malta, in contrast, average annual arrivals of just 
under 1600 people have been recorded over the past 
decade, peaking in 2008 (2775) and 2013 (2008) but 
then declining sharply to 568 in 2014 and 104 in 2015. 
Between January and August in 2016, 115,077 arrivals 
were detected on this route, almost exactly the same 
as the 116,246 arrivals over the same period in 2015. 
The figures remain high, but there is no evidence of a 
redirection of flows from the Eastern Mediterranean to the 
Central route.
Over this time, and as will be seen in more detail in the 
following sections, there has also been a shift in the 
governance of maritime migration in the region. Italian 
and EU agencies have increased their capacity to detect 
and intercept vessels at sea, which has in turn increased 
their capacity to count sea crossings. The vast majority of 
those intercepted are taken to Italian ports, contributing 
to the decrease in arrivals in Malta. 
Migration across the Central Mediterranean 
3
Key points
Migration across the Mediterranean Sea is not a new phenomenon, but in 2011 and especially during 2014 and 2015 there has been 
a dramatic increase in the scale of flows. 
Libya is by far the principle country of departure, although today it is primarily Eastern and sub-Saharan Africans who are on the 
move rather than North Africans. Patterns of forced and labour migration which have for years seen people move to Libya from 
Eastern and sub-Saharan Africa continue. Today, it is primarily these people who are boarding the boats to Italy.
The most recent increase in the scale of migration flows responds to decreasing stability and safety in North African countries 
following the Arab Spring and particularly the re-escalation of the conflict in Libya from 2014. 
©Francesco Zizola/MSF
The dynamics behind these migration patterns are closely 
intertwined with the medium to long-term evolution of 
international migration patterns to and from the Maghreb, 
and particularly Libya. In particular, two key recent shifts 
in migration across the Central Mediterranean should be 
highlighted. The first was an increase of migration flows to 
Italy by boat in 2011 when protests for rights and democracy, 
followed by increasing political instability, swept across many 
countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Governments 
in Tunisia and Egypt fell, and military repression, armed 
insurrection and protracted conflict took hold in Libya. These 
developments came alongside increasing emigration of North 
African nationals and migrants and refugees from elsewhere 
who had previously been resident in places such as Libya and 
Egypt. Thousands were evacuated from Libya in 2011, but 
many, many more remained trapped7.The second shift 
came during 2014 and 2015 when significantly larger flows 
were recorded crossing the Central Mediterranean. The vast 
majority of these journeys departed from the northern shores 
of Libya, as the country descended into renewed civil war 
with chaos and conflict dividing it into separate military and 
political regions in violent battle against one another.
The composition of the population making the sea crossing 
during 2014 and 2015 was highly diverse, including a wide 
range of countries of origin from Sub-Saharan, Central and 
East Africa, as well as places further afield such as Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Syria (Figure 4). This diversity is illustrated by 
the fact that the top ten nationalities of arrivals represented 
only 73% of the total in 2014 and 78% of the total in 2015, in 
stark contrast to the composition of the migration flow on the 
Eastern Mediterranean route where 90% of the total number 
6  Italian data is available from UNHCR at http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean; Maltese data is available from UNHCR at http://www.unhcr.org.mt/charts/cate 
   gory/12 
7  Human Rights Watch (2011) Libya: Stranded Foreign Workers Need Urgent Evacuation https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/02/libya-stranded-foreign-work 
   ers-need-urgent-evacuation 
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Figure 3. Boat arrivals at the Italian and Maltese coasts. Data from UNHCR, Italian Ministry of the Interior and Maltese Immigration Police6
of arrivals was made up of only three nationality groups 8. As 
will be shown later, the motivations for moving and routes taken 
also varied widely.
This diverse composition of nationalities crossing reflects the 
important role that Libya occupied in international migration 
patterns prior to and during the conflict. During the 2000s, 
Libya’s leader Colonel Ghaddafi welcomed sub-Saharan 
African workers with an open-door migration policy. Plentiful 
opportunities in the oil and construction sectors helped Libya 
to become North Africa’s principle hub for migrants. Local and 
regional migration systems within sub-Saharan Africa were also 
interrupted during the 2000s by increasing violence, political 
unrest and economic crises, leading more people to make 
longer journeys in search of safety and better lives9.  In 2006 it 
was estimated that between 65,000 and 120,000 sub-Saharan 
Africans were entering the Maghreb yearly and that several tens 
of thousands of them would try to cross the Mediterranean10.  
By 2011 figures estimated that there could be 2.5 million 
foreign nationals residing in Libya, equivalent to 42% of its 
entire population11.  
The situation of conflict and insecurity has led thousands to flee 
the country by sea. Yet Libya has continued to occupy a vital 
role in international migration systems. In 2014, Syrians unable 
to travel to Europe by air from their place of origin, saw travel 
through Libya by land as a way to reach Europe, for example. 
At the time, they could enter Egypt or Algeria without visas 
before moving on to Libya. But since then, Algeria has removed 
visa free travel arrangements and Egypt has blocked the border 
to Libya12.  As will be explored further in this Research Brief, our 
research clearly shows that for many Libya also continues to 
be considered a popular destination country for migrants and 
refugees from far afield. The following section examines these 
varied journeys in more detail.
8  Data from UNHCR http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php 
9  Altai Consulting for IOM MENA Regional Office (2015) Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots (Altai Consulting); MAFE (2013)  
   Changing patterns of migration between Africa and Europe: Departures, trajectories and returns, MAFE Project Policy Briefing No. 2 (SCMR, UCL & INED),  
   http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/publications/briefs/ 
10 De Haas, H. (2006) Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends, Migration Policy Institute http://www.migration 
   policy.org/article/trans-saharan-migration-north-africa-and-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends
11 MPC (2013) MPC-Migration Profile: Libya, CARIM South database and publications, Migration Policy Centre, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/ 
   migration_profiles/Libya.pdf
12  AI Monitor (2014) ‘Egypt tightens border security amid Libyan unrest’ http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/egypt-tightens-border-controls- 
    libya-unrest-hifter.html
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Figure 4. Nationality of arrivals across the Mediterranean Sea to Italy (2015). Data from UNHCR and Italian Ministry 
of the Interior. See appendix for full figures
In this section we will examine the journeys to and across the 
Central Mediterranean, with a particular focus on the drivers, 
routes and experiences of those making the journey. These 
early findings from our project highlight the complexity of the 
migration flows arriving in Europe and signal some of the 
reasons for their continuation over time.
Beyond forced vs. economic migrants
The migration population arriving in Europe across the 
Mediterranean Sea has often been described according to 
the proportion of nationals from so-called ‘refugee-producing 
countries’13.  This generalisation suggests a coherent and 
more or less structured flow of people who are either refugees 
or economic migrants, according to their country of origin. 
However, our findings show that in reference to the Central 
Mediterranean route, such a view is severely limited and that 
there is a need for a more nuanced understanding of the 
background and character of this migration. 
The drivers of migration to and across the Mediterranean are 
multiple and intersect in complex ways. The migration flow 
brings together people who have left their places of origin for a 
wide range of different reasons. We found that often security, 
political, economic or personal concerns were not mutually 
exclusive influences on their decisions to move. From our 
sample, two thirds (66%) explicitly mentioned motivations 
that could be described as ‘forced migration’, such as 
moments of violence, death threats, religious persecution and 
so on. Moreover, 38% of the respondents also discussed 
economic factors, such as seeking to escape from poverty, 
find employment or be able to send money home to support a 
family. Others mentioned personal reasons such as being in a 
relationship that was disapproved of by friends or family.
If we take a closer look at specific reasons for leaving places 
of origin, the most common were related to insecurity and 
a lack of safety, principally experiences of violence and 
death (of someone close to the interviewee or threats to the 
interviewee’s life). Among people whose journeys originated 
in West Africa the threat posed by militia groups, terrorist 
organisations or armed confraternities, as well as violent rituals, 
land disputes and fights among extended families, were often 
mentioned. Tribal and militia-based violence, for example of Al 
Shabaab in Somalia, were frequently mentioned in interviews 
with East Africans.
13 This terminology can be found, for example, in material produced by UNHCR. See http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php 
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Unpacking the journey: drivers, routes, experiences
Key points
People who migrated through the Central Mediterranean route departed from their countries of origin for a wide range of different 
and often intersecting reasons. 
When people set out from their place of origin they did not necessarily have clear plans about where their final destination would be. 
Their plans were often informed by transnational networks and hearsay picked up along established migration routes.
Migration across the Mediterranean Sea is just one part of several much longer migration flows which originate in and pass through 
numerous countries before merging in Libya. 
Libya is highly dangerous. Over 75% of the people we spoke to who had traversed Libya explicitly referred to experiences of physical 
violence there. Over a quarter spoke of experiences related to death in some way.
The sea journey was considered to be the only way out of Libya: those boarding the boats did not think that there was any other way 
of escaping. 
 I tried to fight back with the Muslims [Boko Haram] but I 
 had to run away. I had nothing in Nigeria. They burned 
everything. There was nothing left there. They tried to kill me”. 
(Nigerian man aged 26) 
 Originally, I was just aiming to get out of Somalia, away  
 from Al Shabaab and to a safe place. My father and 
brother were killed by Al Shabaab and soon after, when my uncle 
was killed, I finally decided I needed to leave”.
(Somalian man aged 18)
Political persecution or localised situations of civil unrest were 
also widespread. Interviewees from places as diverse as 
Gambia, Nigeria and Pakistan spoke of violence due to their 
membership of a political party, the threat of imprisonment 
and facing corrupt or unfair legal processes. The threat of 
permanent conscription into the military and a general lack of 
freedom were key reasons for those who left Eritrea.
 I decided to leave because I was left alone with 
 my children. My husband was in prison and later 
killed. He was a journalist in Eritrea ... several letters had arrived 
about joining the military service which he had so far managed 
to escape with false medical certificates. He was arrested and 
tortured. They wanted information on opponents that he did not 
have. And they killed him” 
(Eritrean woman aged 35)
Finally, to a lesser degree economic reasons were also 
mentioned, such as unemployment and poverty. They 
included the wish to find or improve a job, to move beyond 
living a hand-to-mouth existence, or to be able to send 
remittances from abroad in order for the interviewee’s 
family to survive. In West Africa in particular, there have 
been widespread labour migration patterns of this type for 
decades, the vast majority of which remain within Africa14. 
We found, moreover, that among those arriving in Europe 
from West Africa there were many cases in which had the 
capacity of a family to provide for itself had been harmed by 
a situation of insecurity. 
The diversity of reasons for leaving places of origin 
means that attempts to categorise individual countries as 
producers of either refugees or economic migrants are highly 
problematic. What is more, multiple reasons for migration 
were often inter-related in the decision making of individual 
people. Violence, political persecution or corruption can 
not only put someone’s life in danger, but also harm their 
capacity to provide for themselves and their families. During 
our interviews, people from West African countries such as 
Gambia or Ivory Coast, for example, spoke of contexts of 
crime, political corruption and violence in which there was too 
a lack of economic opportunities. People from Bangladesh 
emphasised economic and political reasons for moving to 
Libya with labour agencies. One Ethiopian man emigrated to 
a refugee camp after his father was unjustly imprisoned, but 
had to continue moving further away to find opportunities 
which would enable him to support his family. Such examples 
highlight the ways that security, political, economic and 
personal reasons for leaving places of origin often feed into 
each other.
 The interviewee comes from a poor family … His eldest  
 brother was the only one with a regular job and he 
provided for the family: he was a “big politician”, but he has been 
killed by members of the rival party ... the interviewee decided to 
emigrate in order to find a job and maintain his family. At that time 
the only possibility was to go to Libya, as there he could obtain a 
visa” 
(Bangladeshi man aged 18)
7
“ 
“
“
“ 
14 Altai Consulting for IOM Nigeria (2015) Irregular Migration between West Africa, North Africa and the Mediterranean (IOM Nigeria)
8Intended destinations
The migration populaThe public perception of the migration 
crisis in European countries has often reflected concern over 
the amount of people arriving, and in turn political leaders 
in many countries have used this fear to justify closing their 
borders against new arrivals. The impression is given that the 
vast majority of migrants in Africa and the Middle East are on 
their way to Europe, and that something should be done to 
deter them15.
In contrast, our research shows that when the migrants and 
refugees on the Central Mediterranean route initially set out 
from their place of origin they often did not have very clear 
plans about where their final destination would be. Only 
one third (37.5%) of the interviewees who spoke about their 
intentions said that they had been intending to move to Europe 
when they set out, and even then they often had little specific 
knowledge about a particular European country. Europe was, 
instead, imagined by many as a place of general safety and 
freedom, a view built up with information from people who had 
made the journey before as well as rumours among friends 
and from accessing European popular culture. 
More precise intentions could, however, develop over the 
course of the migration experience and following arrival in 
Europe. As an example, although less than 1% of those who 
spoke of particular intended destinations said that when they 
set out from their place of origin they were seeking to reach 
Germany, 14.5% said that at the time of the interview they 
decided that they would like to go there.
 I had heard so many times about Italy. On television  
 they show it as a place where life is good. Where there 
is democracy. Where you live peacefully. People who return from 
outside always seem rich” 
(Egyptian man aged 18)
Particularly significant is the number of people who said 
that Libya had been their intended destination. Over one 
third of the respondents (36%) stated that when they left their 
country of origin they were seeking to move there. Many 
expected that there would be readily available employment 
and support from social networks of past emigrants, but they 
also lacked an awareness of the severity of the ongoing conflict 
and security situation. This impression was constructed and 
perpetuated by information exchange through transnational 
networks, from people who had made the journey in previous 
years and smugglers who would relay information back to 
countries of transit and origin whilst offering to facilitate the 
journey. It is a clear sign of the strength and durability of pre-
existing migration networks from Africa and further afield.
 I wanted to go to Libya. In Libya there are some   
 problems, I knew there was a conflict there but I had one 
friend who said they would help me to find a job” 
(Ghanaian man aged 29)
 Even if [the connection men] knew the truth [about  
 Libya], they wouldn’t tell you. And you wouldn’t believe it 
until you see it” 
(Nigerian man aged 32)
Of the remainder of the research participants (27%), nearly 
every one stated that when they left their place of origin they 
sought either a nearby place or had no specific destination in 
mind. Often, they had intended to get away from a particular 
situation of harm, with little time to prepare, or were seeking 
labour opportunities that were not too far from home. This 
was particularly the case among people who originated from 
countries in West Africa.
 We didn’t know anything about Malta, we didn’t know  
 where we were going. This was the same for me when I 
left Gambia, I didn’t know where I was going, I didn’t have a plan. I 
just wanted to find somewhere stable to live and work” 
 (Gambian man aged 20)
15  BBC News (2016) ‘EU’s Tusk warns illegal economic migrants: Do not come here’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35714087
“ 
“
“ 
“ 
Routes and experiences
Rather than representing one homogeneous flow, migration 
across the Central Mediterranean should be seen primarily as a 
product of the merging of multiple flows from diverse locations 
within and beyond the African continent. These flows are varied 
in terms of the routes and experiences of the journeys that are 
made and bring together a diverse composition of people with 
an array of motivations and aspirations.
From our sample we have identified 36 different countries that 
our interviewees had traversed before reaching Italy or Malta, 
and 68 different combinations of routes through them. These 
routes would converge and diverge in certain countries and 
towns or cities, evolving over several months or even years (see 
Figure 5). The multiple flows that merge through the Central 
Mediterranean can be broadly categorised in four main routes 
according to their geographical provenience:
1. A North African route originating in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya 
or Egypt, with only one leg by boat across the sea to 
Europe. 
2. A West African route originating in countries of West and 
sub-Saharan Africa16,  made up of highly fragmented and 
often lengthy trajectories with multiple stops along the way. 
Disparate flows would converge in Burkina Faso (35% 
of our interviewees from this region), Mali (45%) and then 
Niger (83%) on the way to Libya (99% of interviewees).
3. An East African route originating in the Horn of Africa17,  
made up of fragmented and long trajectories with various 
stops, often first in towns or refugee camps in Ethiopia 
or Sudan. 96% of our interviewees from East African 
countries stopped in Sudan and most of them (70%) 
stayed in Khartoum. From there if they were unable to 
travel by air then they would set out to cross Libya or, less 
frequently Egypt, by land towards the Mediterranean. 
4. Routes from the rest of the world show patterns of 
migration that did not easily fit into the types outlined 
above, originating in countries beyond Africa such as 
Syria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Moreover, they equally 
converged with the others in Libya.
Few respondents from our sample had moved directly to 
Europe within a short timescale. Instead, it was more common 
for journeys to be interspersed with short or long stops in 
various locations before deciding to come to Europe. This is 
reflected in the fact that 28% of our interviewees had left their 
country of origin between 1 and 6 months before arriving 
and 42% had done so more than a year before arriving. One 
fifth (20%) of respondents reported considerably broader 
trajectories incorporating lengthy periods of settlement in 
multiple places over several years. 
9
16  From our sample interviewees on this route came from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra  
    Leone or Togo
17  From our sample interviewees on this route came from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia or Sudan
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Along these different routes, quite distinct dynamics and 
experiences could be found, as well as smaller sub-flows 
with their own particular characteristics. Common across all 
of them was the primarily fragmentary and protracted nature 
of migration trajectories to Europe, with stops of varying 
lengths in certain places punctuated by moments of onward 
movement. These stops and journeys often had particular 
drivers and dynamics.
Initial migration patterns from countries of origin were usually 
directed at nearby locations where it would be possible to 
rest, find employment, connect with friends or kin or find 
someone to facilitate onward movement. In the ECOWAS 
free movement area of West Africa, local and regional 
migration of this type could be organised at short notice by 
travel agencies, friends or family members. It would involve 
travel by bus, car or hitching a lift, with the possibility of 
moving easily in many cases enabling people to quickly 
get away from situations of violence or personal danger. In 
East Africa, in contrast, migration initially involved crossing 
often dangerous borders, particularly in the case of Eritrea 
where snipers would reportedly shoot at people attempting 
to cross. The journey required planning, preparation and 
sometimes the aid of a smuggler to be carried out.
Subsequent onward migration would follow stops in places 
relatively near to the place of origin. Stops could be short, 
intended only as rest to wait for a connection, seek a 
smuggler or find temporary work to pay for the journey to 
the intended destination, as was widely reported of Burkina 
Faso and especially Niger where extreme poverty and a 
harsh climate meant few people considered staying there 
for long. Elsewhere, onward movement could also come in 
response to a lack of opportunities or a need to escape new 
situations of insecurity, as was common among Gambians 
in Mali and Eritreans in Sudanese or Ethiopian refugee 
camps, for example. 
Onward migration could also take place months or years 
after the primary movement. Lengthy periods of settlement 
and attempts to start a new life were reported among East 
Africans in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, for example, 
or among Syrians in Egypt. Onward movement came 
when economic opportunities appeared to have run out or 
corruption was seen as too much of an obstacle in these 
places. In the specific case of Egypt, Syrians spoke of 
moving away due to increasing restrictions and repression in 
everyday life following the establishment of the government 
of Abdeh Fattah el-Sisi.
For 96% of our interviewees, these onward movements 
eventually involved crossing into Libya. As noted above, 
there was a widespread perception among many of those 
on the move that Libya continued to be a place of plentiful 
opportunities to work, as indeed it was for many people 
before 2011. The journeys into Libya were, however, 
fraught with difficulties and required smugglers to negotiate 
the route. From the South through Niger, migrants and 
refugees would be squeezed onto pick-ups and driven 
through the desert with a high risk of dying from drought, 
starvation or falling from the vehicle. On the journey through 
Chad or Sudan to the South East our interviewees frequently 
experienced forced stops at military checkpoints and traps set 
by militia or bandits.
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Figure 5. Duration of journeys to Europe through Central Mediterranean in months (% of respondents)
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Kidnappings were common, although it was often unclear who 
the perpetrators were from among bandits, militia organisations 
or even the military of that particular country. From Algeria in the 
West, bribes would often be needed to pass armed guards at 
border checkpoints.
The final onward migration flows to Europe were in almost all 
cases those departing from Libya. This movement was for the 
vast majority motivated by a search for safety from violence 
and exploitation. Experiences of being kidnapped, arbitrarily 
arrested, held up at gunpoint or not paid for a day’s work were 
described by almost all of our interviewees. Over 75% of the 
people we spoke to who had traversed Libya explicitly referred 
to experiences of physical violence there. Over a quarter had 
an experience related to death in some way, such as seeing 
someone shot or die from hunger, or watching a boat sink out 
at sea. Women spoke of being unable to leave their places 
of residence and suffering sexual as well as physical violence. 
Such experiences appear to be more or less indiscriminate, 
affecting all age groups to a similar degree, except perhaps for 
a slight decline in experiences of violence and death among 
older people.
 They took us to a very isolated place and we lived in a  
 stable for a month, where there were also animals. We 
couldn’t leave. On the farm there were other women who had also 
arrived from Nigeria. The men who were to supposed to watch us 
raped us many times
(Nigerian woman aged 25)
Some of those fleeing Libya had resided there for a long 
time, such as Bangladeshi workers who had moved there in 
the years preceding the war, arriving by plane directly from 
Bangladesh or following previous stops in the Middle East. 
Others sought to remain in Libya only long enough to find 
a way to leave. Among those we met, the sea journey was 
considered to be the only way out: they saw no other way of 
escaping the country. 
 Libya is like a hole. You can enter and then you can’t go  
 back … they seize you when you are going, it is very 
difficult to get out” 
(Gambian man aged 19)
 
“
“ 
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The rising and evolving migration flows across the Central 
Mediterranean since 2011 have been accompanied by 
significant transformations in the governance of mobility and 
border control in the region, in particular in Italy. This has 
been accompanied by a rapid expansion of the reception 
system for newcomers. The context of reception for refugees 
and migrants who have crossed the sea highlights, however, 
the multidimensional nature of the crisis: while there may 
be consensus among Italian and EU policymakers on the 
immediate importance of saving lives at sea, there has been 
less agreement on what the long-term perspective should be 
after the boat journey18. 
From sea to land
In response to increasing migration flows and the rising death rate 
across the Central Mediterranean, policymakers and humanitarian 
organisations have expanded their operations at sea significantly. 
Tragedies in which hundreds died in 2013 and 2015 acted as 
the catalyst for the Mare Nostrum operation led by the Italian 
Navy throughout 2014 and the Joint Operation Triton under 
the command of the EU border agency Frontex during 2015. 
The Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (based at the 
Capitaneria di Porto in Rome) took on an overall coordinating role. 
Frontex also established the Joint Operation Sophia which was 
set the objective of seeking to destroy boats potentially used for 
smuggling but has faced a range of legal and logistical difficulties 
in carrying this out in practice19. At the same time, numerous 
humanitarian organisations such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
SOS Mediterranee and MOAS have contributed with their own 
rescue missions.
The sense of crisis at sea has brought about a unification of the 
maritime governance of the route, pooling together resources 
and taking all rescued migrants and refugees to the reception 
system in Italy, unless in situations of urgent medical need. The 
interception of boats at sea during 2014 and 2015 also brought 
about the de facto disappearance of almost all spontaneous 
and undetected sea arrivals in Italy and Malta and contributed to 
what can be considered a ‘normalisation of the emergency’. In 
Italy and Malta the tone of political and public debate moved from 
18   McMahon, S. (2016) ‘After the boats: refugee reception and the production of irregularity in Italy’s migration crisis’, Middle East Institute Refugees Adrift?  
    Series, www.mei.edu/content/map/after-boats-refugee-reception-and-production-irregularity-italy-s-migration-crisis
19  McMahon, S. and Malcolm, J (2015) Humanitarian emergency is being used to justify dangerous measures to stop migration, The Conversation (https:// 
    theconversation.com/humanitarian-emergency-is-being-used-to-justify-dangerous-measures-to-stop-migration-40734) 
After the boat: policy context and reception conditions
Key points
During the 2000s and especially since 2011 there was a rapid expansion of refugee and migrant reception measures at sea and 
facilities in Italy.
Sea interceptions of boats de facto stopped almost all spontaneous arrivals on Italian and Maltese shores and regularised the 
disembarkation process.
Almost all refugees and migrants are taken to Italy, where a complex reception system is in place to identify, categorise and relocate 
them.
Deficiencies in the Italian reception system, arbitrary decision-making and the efforts of migrants and refugees to transit out of Italy 
contributed to a widespread production of irregular migration and settlement.
The recent establishment of ‘hotspots’ in Italy has represented an attempt to Europeanise the crisis, but at the same time 
encapsulates deep tensions pervading the EU project as a whole.
emphasising perceived threats from clandestine migration 
(and an associated vocabulary of ‘invasions’ and ‘tidal 
waves’) to a more humanitarian narrative constructed 
around sea rescues and Christian values of solidarity (with 
Pope Francis occupying an important moral leadership role), 
although the policy objective has continued to be to stop the 
migration flows. 
 
Following interception at sea, almost all of the people 
making the Central Mediterranean crossing in 2015 were 
taken to Italian shores, where they entered into a complex, 
multi-layered refugee reception system. The current official 
reception system in Italy is basically two-pronged: there is an 
‘ordinary’ system providing short-term accommodation, legal 
support and then longer-term measures for integration for 
asylum claimants (the SPRAR system), and an ‘emergency’ 
one which provides only short-term accommodation and 
basic services. In response to the increase in arrivals in 2014 
and 2015, the emergency regime underwent an enormous 
and rapid expansion: whereas in February 2015 there were 
37,028 people recorded in temporary reception centres (the 
CAS), by November of the same year this had increased 
to 72,377. At the end of July 2016, 104,606 people were 
housed in temporary reception centres20. At the same time, 
the existing ordinary system was, and is, often co-opted into 
receiving emergency arrivals.
While effective in rapidly increasing Italy’s stock of places 
for refugees and migrants, the developments of 2015 
led to many concerns being raised regarding the uneven 
and often sub-standard quality of service provision in the 
emergency system, as well as cases of outright corruption21. 
The reception regime overall in Italy continued to suffer from 
insufficient space to accommodate new arrivals, which 
was further aggravated by lengthy bureaucratic timescales 
meaning months could pass before an appointment with an 
asylum commission would be confirmed. 
One implication of the shortcomings of the formal reception 
system is a widespread production of irregular migration and 
settlement. This can be defined as a third informal reception 
regime alongside the formal ordinary and emergency ones22. 
The informal regime mostly caters for three categories of 
people: those who were previously in the formal system but 
no longer had an entitlement to support; those who didn’t 
want to apply for asylum in Italy and wanted to rapidly move 
to other destinations without being identified, and those who 
despite applying for asylum did not want or were not offered 
a place in the formal reception system. 
In Figure 6 we find two indicators of the scale of the issue. 
The first is the gap between sea arrivals (the blue bar) and 
the number of asylum applications lodged (the yellow bar). 
This highlights that although everyone who was intercepted 
at sea in 2015 was taken into the refugee reception system, 
a large part of them did not complete applications for asylum 
(and this gap is likely to be even wider as the figure for 
asylum applications also includes individuals who did not 
arrive by sea). Many, especially (although not exclusively) 
from countries in the Horn of Africa, North Africa or Syria, 
became so-called transitanti (migrants in transit) who sought 
to leave Italy and move on to other countries. Existent social 
and kinship networks across Europe, as well as solidarity 
groups and social movements within Italy, supported their 
onward movement and warned them that they should 
leave the formal reception centres if they did not want to be 
‘parked’ in Italy’s slow and unpredictable asylum system. 
This practice has been object of contention in the EU and 
during 2016 neighbouring countries sought to significantly 
reduce it through the introduction of tighter controls at entry 
and exit points to and from Italy, as well as proposing a 
security fence at the Italo-Austrian border.
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20  Latest data on the reception system is available from the Italian Ministry of the Interior at http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/ 
    documentazione/statistica/cruscotto-statistico-giornaliero 
21  MSF (2016) Fuori Campo (Medecins Sans Frontieres), http://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/notizie/news/fuori-campo-mappa-dell%E2%80%99accoglienza- 
    che-esclude; LasciateCIEntrare (2016) Accoglienza: La Vera Emergenza (LasciateCIEntrare) http://www.lasciatecientrare.it/j25/italia/news-italia/193- 
    scaricabile-il-rapporto-di-lasciatecientrare-accogliere-la-vera-emergenza
22  MSF (2016) Fuori Campo (Medecins Sans Frontieres), http://www.medicisenzafrontiere.it/notizie/news/fuori-campo-mappa-dell%E2%80%99accoglienza-  
    che-esclude 
The second indicator is the gap between those not granted 
a legal status to remain in Italy (asylum rejections) and those 
given deportation orders. This signals a large proportion of 
people who were not given legal status to remain in Italy, 
and therefore not able to access the services of the formal 
reception system, but were not physically removed from the 
country either. During our fieldwork it became increasingly 
common for people also to be given ‘deferred expulsion 
orders’ telling them to leave Italian territory on their own, 
although they obviously lacked the resources to be able to 
do so. In such a situation, migrants and refugees may find 
local support networks to help them lodge their asylum 
applications or they may move into informal accommodation 
and work in the underground labour market23.  For many, 
living conditions have been deplorable and dangerous.
 We are very good in rescuing them in the sea, the Italians  
 the efforts they are doing are amazing. Everything that 
happens in the sea, with the boats, they are very good in the first 
part, and after that, when we talk about long-term solutions, the 
country has a very weak system” 
(Stakeholder)
The Europeanisation of the crisis: a crisis of 
Europe?
Over the course of 2015 there were also intensified 
calls by the Italian and Maltese governments for closer 
cooperation among EU institutions and Member 
States in the management of irregular crossings in the 
Mediterranean. This was not especially new. Malta had 
consistently called for such measures for over a decade. 
The transition from Mare Nostrum to Operation Triton and 
its successor Operation Triton Plus in late 2014 had also 
already taken a first step towards greater cooperation. The 
next step consisted in a gradual shift of attention away 
from maritime operations onto ways of managing refugees 
and migrants once on land. The outcome has been the 
establishment of a series of ‘hotspots’ at the Italian ports 
of Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Trapani and Taranto where new 
arrivals are contained, identified and relocated (either to 
the Italian reception system, to other EU Member States 
or to countries of origin). The European Asylum Support 
Agency (EASO) has also been given greater resources and 
responsibility, heralding closer involvement of the EU not 
only in Italian border management but also in the status 
recognition of asylum applications. The Italian authorities have 
at the same time been pressured by neighbouring EU
14
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23  McMahon, S. (2015) ‘For migrants in Sicily, group expulsion is the order of the day – but is it legal?’, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/for- 
    migrants-in-sicily-group-expulsion-is-the-order-of-the-day-but-is-it-legal-49611; McMahon, S. (2016) ‘After the boats: refugee reception and the production  
    of irregularity in Italy’s migration crisis’, Middle East Institute Refugees Adrift? Series, www.mei.edu/content/map/after-boats-refugee-reception-and- 
    production-irregularity-italy-s-migration-crisis
Figure 6. Arrivals, asylum applications, deportations in Italy (Jan - Oct 2015). Data from Italian Ministry of the Interior.
Member States into carrying out more stringent identification 
procedures. Meanwhile, the relocation programme to places 
within Europe has dramatically failed to reach its intended 
targets: as of 30th August 2016 only 1020 people had been 
relocated from Italy, far behind the target of 39,60024.
One of the implications of the process of Europeanisation, 
with the associated tightening of identification measures and 
restrictions on informal transit migration, has been a spike in 
asylum applications. As a result, the already overwhelmed 
Italian asylum system has had to process a higher volume 
of applicants than before. The closure of transit routes out 
of Italy and the repatriation of people from northern border 
towns such as Ventimiglia to the Hotspots in the south have 
further compounded the difficulty of the situation. People are 
being kept in Italy despite the fact that many of them had 
never intended to move to or stay there when they began their 
migration experience. 
Data on asylum decisions (see Figure 7) also show that at 
the same time Italian authorities’ have adopted a less benign 
approach to asylum applications from ‘non refugee-producing 
countries’, with rejections raising considerably. The practice 
of issuing deferred expulsion orders seems to have become 
more frequent too. These processes have brought about an 
increase in the production of illegality among the migrant and 
refugee population. The ultimate goal seems to be to deter 
secondary migration towards the north of Europe, but in 
practice it risks creating a large precarious population with few 
rights and no access to formal reception facilities and support 
networks.
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24    A regularly updated ‘State of play’ of the relocation programme is available at https://t.co/wlzda4suJL 
Figure 7. Asylum application outcomes in Italy during 2015. Data from Italian Ministry of the Interior.
Rejections (%)
Refugee status (%)
Protection status 
(subsidiary or 
humanitarian)  (%) 
Other outcomes (%)
As we have seen in this Research Brief, migration across 
the Mediterranean Sea is not a new phenomenon, but in 
2011 and especially during 2014 and 2015 there was a 
dramatic increase in the scale of migration flows. Libya 
was, and continues today to be, by far the main country of 
departure, although it is primarily Eastern and sub-Saharan 
Africans who are on the move rather than North Africans. As 
well as people travelling to Europe, patterns of forced and 
labour migration which have for years seen people move to 
Libya from Eastern and sub-Saharan Africa continue, but 
due to the context of violence and insecurity there, they end 
up boarding the boats and heading out to sea
The migration flow across the Central Mediterranean 
route is diverse in many ways. It is composed of an array 
of nationalities and ethnicities, who have usually travelled 
through various countries over a period of months or 
years before arriving in Europe. What is often considered 
a homogeneous migration flow across the sea should in 
reality, therefore, be seen as a series of sub-flows that 
converge in Libya. Experiences of refugees and migrants in 
these sub-flows vary, as do the dynamics of the journeys. 
What is common across most of them is the fragmented 
and protracted nature of the broader migration trajectories 
and experiences of violence in Libya.
This diversity and complexity of motivations and 
experiences provides a challenge for the reception 
system in Italy and the rest of Europe. Although policy 
responses and public opinion have often presented a binary 
categorisation between forced and economic migrants 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea, our research highlights 
varying ways that the drivers of migration are complex and 
intersect with one another. Security, economic and personal 
motivations for leaving a place of origin or for getting on 
a boat to Europe are often not mutually exclusive, but 
inter-related. This complicates the process of determining 
the legal status and asylum applications of people arriving 
in Europe, as international protection is dependent on the 
individual’s experience rather than their nationality. 
The governance of migration across the Central 
Mediterranean has also undergone significant changes, 
particularly in relation to the shifting role of the EU and 
its Member States at Italy’s borders. Sea interceptions 
of migrant boats have de facto stopped almost all 
spontaneous arrivals on Italian and Maltese shores, creating 
an impression of control and order in the governance of 
the crisis. Yet at the same time deficiencies in the reception 
system, arbitrary decision-making and the efforts of 
migrants and refugees to transit out of Italy have contributed 
to an unpredictable situation of widespread production of 
irregular migration and settlement. 
In this context, the establishment of hotspots and the 
failure of the refugee relocation programme are symbols 
of a stuttering attempt to Europeanise the governance of 
migration across the Central Mediterranean. In practice, 
migrants and refugees are being increasingly contained in 
Italy. This is despite the fact, highlighted in our interviews, 
that many of those making the crossing did not intend to 
move to or stay in Italy when they set out from their place 
of origin or even when they boarded the boats in Libya. The 
outcome is a reception system for refugees and migrants 
which struggles to catch up with the reality as it plays out 
on the ground.
Conclusions
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Since September 2015 a team of researchers led by the 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at 
Coventry University working in collaboration with University 
of Birmingham’s Institute for Research into Superdiversity 
and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford 
University in the UK and partners in Greece (ELIAMEP), 
Italy (FIERI), Turkey (Yasar University) and Malta (People for 
Change Foundation), has been undertaking research into 
the migration crisis at the borders of Southern Europe. 
The MEDMIG project aims to better understand the 
processes which influence, inform and shape migration by 
speaking directly with those who crossed the Mediterranean 
in 2015 and with the numerous state and non-state 
actors who create opportunities and constraints along 
the way. It provides the first large-scale, systematic and 
comparative study of the backgrounds, experiences, 
routes and aspirations of refugees and migrants in three 
EU Member States - Italy, Greece and Malta – and Turkey. 
Our researchers were based in the field from September 
2015 to January 2016, observing events as they unfolded. 
During this time we interviewed 500 refugees and migrants 
travelling via the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes: 
205 in Italy (Sicily, Apulia, Rome, Piedmont, Bologna) and 
20 in Malta (Central Mediterranean route); 215 in Greece 
(Athens, Lesvos) and 60 in Turkey (Izmir, Istanbul) (Eastern 
Mediterranean route). We also interviewed more than 100 
stakeholders, including politicians, policy makers, naval 
officers and coastguards, representatives of international, 
non-governmental and civil society organisations, as well 
as volunteers to gain broader insights into the experiences 
and journeys of the refugees and migrants with whom they 
come into contact.
These four countries enable a comparison of the 
backgrounds, experiences and aspirations of those using 
different routes and contribute to better understanding 
the ways that nationality, economic status and education, 
gender, ethnicity and age shape the journeys and 
experiences of refugees and migrants. This also enables 
us to investigate how migration flows respond to changing 
political opportunities and policy openings led by national 
governments and EU-wide initiatives. Within these 
countries the project employed a purposive sampling 
strategy to ensure that the backgrounds and demographic 
characteristics of respondents were broadly reflective of 
wider trends.
Further information about the MEDMIG project, past 
and forthcoming events and future outputs together with 
contacts details for all of the team members can be found 
on our website www.medmig.info 
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Appendix 1: Nationalities of MEDMIG interviewees from the 
Central Mediterranean route
Nationality Number of interviewees
Gambia 45
Nigeria 42
Ghana 21
Eritrea 15
Mali 14
Ivory Coast 14
Senegal 10
Bangladesh 8
Guinea 6
Somalia 4
Syria 4
Egypt 4
Morocco 3
Togo 2
Sudan 2
Ethiopia 2
Palestine 1
Pakistan 1
Benin 1
Cameroon 1
Tunisia 1
Burkina Faso 1
Appendix 2: Nationalities of irregular arrivals by boat to Italy 
in 2015
Country of origin 2015
Eritrea 39162
Nigeria 22237
Somalia 12433
Sudan 8932
Gambia 8454
Syrian Arab Republic 7448
Senegal 5981
Mali 5826
Bangladesh 5040
Morocco 4647
Ghana 4431
Côte d'Ivoire 3772
Ethiopia 2631
Guinea 2629
Egypt 2610
Pakistan 1982
Palestinian Occ. Terr. 1673
Iraq 996
Tunisia 880
Cameroon 662
Other 11,417
Total 153843
Data from UNHCR and Italian Ministry of the Interior
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